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Abstract 
This paper investigates the optimal policy for foreign economic aids and welfare effects foreign aids policy coordination between 
asymmetric donor countries in terms of income level. When donor countries are altruistic with higher welfare from the increased 
income of the poor in the recipient country, it has been argued for aids policy coordination to reduce a common good problem. 
Based on a simple model considering asymmetric donors making endogenous decision on the amount of aids and recipient country 
making decision on the income transfer for the poor people, we demonstrate that aids policy coordination does not always welfare 
dominates the non-cooperative aids policies. The results imply that when the asymmetry of donor countries’ income level is higher 
than the critical level, aids policy sovereignty can be welfare dominant to uniform aids policy coordination. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) stresses the need for coherent policies across the 
governments of member countries regarding the international poverty reduction goal in order to allow effective 
alleviation of poverty. From this perspective, the UN has encouraged DAC member countries to provide Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) up to 0.7 percent of their gross national income (GNI). However, there has been little 
consideration about whether this 0.7-percent uniform cooperation is actually reasonable among relatively rich 
countries as an objective for aid budgets in practice. The target was set more than half a century ago, founded on 
assumptions and models that are no longer regarded as credible.* Furthermore, only 5 out of 28 DAC countries have 
 
 
* See Michael and Todd (2005). 
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reached this uniformly set goal, while the average performance has been less than 0.4 percent - far lower than the 
target, 0.7 percent of GNI.†  
This paper examine whether the cooperation among donor countries, specifically the provision of foreign economic 
aid as a uniform share of the income level of the donor countries serves as an optimal foreign aid policy based on 
widespread criticism against this uniform guideline considering the wide range asymmetry of income levels of DAC 
member countries.  
The effects of international aid to developing countries have been studied in a wide literature. Brecher and Bhagwati 
(1982) demonstrated that an international transfer may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or enrich the 
donor country, which is labelled as a transfer paradox. Lahiri and Raimondos (1997) showed that foreign aid, tied to 
tariff reform in the recipient country, can result in Pareto improvement. The allocation of aid to recipient countries 
was also studied by Lahiri and Raimondos (2000), considering the ethnic lobbying as one of the important determinants 
in aid distribution.  
More recent contributions in international transfer are concerned with various kinds of worldwide coordination. 
Lahiri, Raimondos, Wong and Woodland (2001) showed that when the donor chooses the optimal transfer, the two 
countries can reach the Pareto-efficient point without depending on bargaining and cooperation suggested by recent 
multilateral trade talks. Torsvic (2004) demonstrated that cooperation among symmetric donor countries can decrease 
world utility with the decreased income transfer for the low income group in the recipient country. Bigsten and 
Tengstam (2015) focused on the behavior of donors, and provided estimates of the level of poverty alleviation that 
could be obtained if the donors jointly optimized their aid allocation across countries.  
The major difference between the preceding studies and this paper lies in that this paper focused on cooperation in 
the phase of determining the amount of aid given to the recipient. We examine whether the world welfare from aids 
policy coordination with a uniform rule between asymmetric donors in income levels is dominant to the case of non-
coordinated aids policies. We demonstrate that the sovereign aids policy with no uniform rule is welfare dominant 
when the income level asymmetry among donor countries is higher than the critical level.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model for this study, and presents the optimization 
problems of each donor and recipient country. Section 3 determines the equilibrium amounts of aids and domestic 
transfer for the lower income group in the recipient country. Section 4 evaluates welfare effects of aids policy 
coordination and shows that global welfare from non-coordinated aids policy is higher than the case of aids 
coordination when the income asymmetry of donors is higher than the critical level. Finally,  section 5 concludes and 
discusses policy implications.  
2. Basic model 
There are two altruistic donor countries; their welfare increases with the income level of the poor people in recipient 
countries, and thus the alleviation of poverty is a common good which, in all likelihood, leads to a common good 
problem that requires cooperation across donors.  
We examine the effects of cooperation in the provision of foreign economic aid between two donor countries, 
denoted 1 and 2 with asymmetry in the income levels. Each donor country’s government decides the level of aids to 
the poor in the recipient country, by dividing a fixed income of the donor country, iY  (per capita concept), between 
domestic consumption, iC , and foreign aids, iA . Each donor’s budget constraint is given as:  
 
                          i i iY C A   where 1,2i  .                        (1) 
 
 
 
† The five countries are Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and United Kingdom according to DAC members’ net official development 
assistance in 2013 from the OECD DAC. 
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There is a recipient country, R , that receives the foreign aid. In the recipient country, there is a representative rich 
individual ( r ) and poor individual ( p ). Let jI  represents   the income that type j ( ,j r p ) would earn without 
intervention by the domestic government or foreign countries, given that r pI I! . The government in R  ( R -
government) reallocates income between the two types of people. Let T  be the amount of lump sum taxes the 
government collects from the rich person and transfers to the poor person. T  is negative in case there is a transfer 
from the poor to the rich.  
 
The consumption of the rich and the poor in the recipient country is given as: 
 
r rC I T   
p pC I T TA                                        (2)  
where TA  denotes the total amount of foreign aid received by the poor person, i.e. 1 2TA A A  . 
 
Each donor maximizes the welfare function,  
 
( , ) ln( ) (1 ) lnρ ( )ρi i p i i i pW C C C C                      (3) 
 
subject to the budget constraint. ‘1-ρi ’ implies the degree of altruism of the donor i, 0 1ρid d , where the lower 
ρi  indicates a more altruistic donor. Both domestic consumption and the consumption of the poor are strictly normal 
goods.  
The R -government maximizes  
 
 
( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )r p r pV C C C CJ J                             (4) 
 
subject to the constraints. J  implies the weight that the R -government puts on the consumption of the rich person, 
0 1Jd d . 
3. The equilibrium of cooperative and non-cooperative ODA provision. 
To assess the effects cooperation of ODA policies, we examine the equilibrium of each case of cooperative and 
non-cooperative ODA provision. It is assumed that the income level of donor country 1 is e  times higher than that of 
donor country 2, i.e., 
 
1Y eY  and 2Y Y , where 1 ed . 
 
Donor 1 and 2 have symmetric income levels if 1e  , while donor 1 is richer than donor 2 if1 e . 
 
3.1. Equilibrium of non-cooperative aids provision. 
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Suppose that each donor and the R -government simultaneously make independent decisions, and that the total 
support provided to the poor in R  is given by the profile 1 2( , , )A A T , which constitutes a Nash-equilibrium in this 
game. The profile 
* * *
1 2( , , )
nc nc ncA A T  is a Nash-equilibrium if, and only if, 
*nc
iA  maximizes ( , )i i pW C C  for 
1,2i   and *ncT  maximizes ( , )r pV C C . 
 
   The welfare of the donor country 1 is defined as the altruistic summation of the utility from the consumption in 
the donor country and the utility from the consumption by the poor of the recipient country. Therefore, the optimal 
amount of the aids is derived from the donor country social welfare maximization problem subject to the income 
constraint as follows:     
1
1 1 1 1 1max ( , ) ln( ) (1ρ ρ ) ln( )p pA W C C C C    
subject to 1 1eY C A  , 1 2p pC I T A A      
i.e. 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2max ( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln )ρ ρ (p pA W C C eY A I T A A                 (5) 
 
  The amount of the aids, 1A , is obtained from the following first order condition as a best response function: 
 
                 
1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1 ρ 0ρ
p
W
A eY A I T A A
w     w    
                   (6) 
 
Î 1 1 1 2ρ(1 ) ( )ρ pA e Y I T A     .                          (7) 
 
  In the same way, the optimal aid of donor country 2 is derived as follows:   
 
2
2 2 2 2 2max ( , ) ln( ) (1ρ ρ ) ln( )p pA W C C C C    
subject to 2 2Y C A  , 1 2p pC I T A A     
i.e. 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2max ( , ) ln( ) (1 )ρ lρ n( )p pA W C C Y A I T A A                   (8) 
 
  2A  must be solved for the first order condition:  
 
                  
2 2 2
2 2 1 2
1 ρ 0ρ
p
W
A Y A I T A A
w     w    
                    (9) 
 
Î 2 2 2 1ρ ρ(1 ) ( )pA Y I T A                              (10) 
 
 
  The recipient country decides the optimal amount of income transfer from the rich to the poor from her welfare 
maximization problem defined as follows:  
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max ( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )r p r pT V C C C CJ J    
subject to r rC I T  , 1 2p pC I T A A     
i.e. 
1 2max ( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )r p r pT V C C I T I T A AJ J                  (11) 
 
  The optimal amount of transfer is obtained from the following first order condition:  
 
                1 2
γ γ1 0
r p
V
T I T I T A A
w     w    
                   (12) 
  
                          Î 1 2γ) γ(1 )( r pT I I A A    .                        (13) 
 
   It is shown that the government R  reduces domestic support, T , provided to the poor as foreign aid increases. 
 
  Solving the two first order conditions gives Nash-equilibrium amounts of foreign economic aid and domestic 
support that the poor receive, 
* * *
1 2( , , )
nc nc ncA A T . From equations (7), (10) and (13) and assuming 21ρ ρ ρ  for 
simplicity of the analysis, we obtain:  
 
*
1
{ ( 1) (1 )} (1 )( )
2 1
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
r pnc e Y I IA
J J J
J
                              (14) 
 
*
2
{ 1 (1 )ρ ρ } (1
ρ
) )
2
ρ (
ρ 1
r pnc e Y I IA
J J J
J
                             (15) 
 
* ( 1)( 1) ( 1) { ( 1) }
2
ρ ρ
ρ ρ 1
r pnc I I e YT
J J
J
        .                    (16) 
3.2. Equilibrium of cooperative aids provision. 
Suppose that the donors cooperate. The objective function then becomes the total utility of the donors, and they 
choose a uniform level of aid, A . The donors and the R -government make decisions simultaneously, and the total 
support provided to the poor in R  is given by the profile ( , , )A A T , which constitutes a Nash-equilibrium in this 
game. The profile
* * *( , , )c c cA A T is a Nash-equilibrium if, and only if, 
*cA maximizes 
1 1 2 2)( , ( ),p pW W C CC W C   and *cT  maximizes ( , )r pV C C . 
 
3.2.1. Optimization problem of donors 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2max ln( ) ln(ρ ρ ρ) (2 n )ρ ) l ( pA W C C C      
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subject to 1eY C A  , 2Y C A  , 2p pC I T A     
i.e. 
1 2 1 2max ln( ) ln( ) (2 ) ln( 2 )ρ ρ ρ ρ pA W eY A Y A I T A                 (17) 
 
The first order condition is given by 
 
1 212 2(2 ) 0
2
ρ ρ ρ ρ
p
W
A eY A Y A I T A
 w      w    
                  (18) 
 
3.2.2. Optimization problem of the recipient 
 
max ( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )r p r pT V C C C CJ J    
subject to r rC I T  , 2p pC I T A    
 i.e. 
max ( , ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( 2 )r p r pT V C C I T I T AJ J                   (19) 
 
T must be solved for the first order condition 
 
                   
1 0
2r p
V
T I T I T A
J Jw     w   
                        (20) 
 
and thus 
 
(1 ) ( 2 )r pT I I AJ J    .                              (21) 
 
3.2.3. Equilibrium 
* * *( , , )c c cA A T  
 
By equations (18) and (21) and under the assumption of 21ρ ρ ρ ,   *cA  must satisfy 
 
2ρ ρ ρ4(1 ) 2{( 1)( 2) ( 1 )ρ )( }c cr pA e Y I I AJ J J         
{4 ( 1) ( 1)(1 )( )}ρ ρ 0r peY e I I YJ                                (22) 
 
and 
 
                       
* *(1 ) ( 2 )c cr pT I I AJ J                               (23) 
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4. The welfare effects of coordination in aids policies 
The trends of various results can be observed numerically and compared according to different levels of e . 
Comparison can be made of the variables between the cases of cooperating donors and non-cooperating donors, 
wherein the donors have asymmetric economic levels.   
 
4.1. The trends of foreign aid and domestic support  
 
Let 21ρ  7ρ = 0.9 , 0.9J  , 100Y  , 20rI   and 5pI  . The donors are primarily concerned with their 
own consumption, and the government in R  is largely concerned with the consumption of the rich in R .  
 
4.1.1 The case of non-cooperating donors 
 
Equations (14), (15) and (16) can be rewritten and graphed as follows. 
 
*
1 56.6964 54.1295
ncA e   
 
*
2 43.3036 45.8705
ncA e    
 
* 12.0536 4.9330ncT e    
 
 
 
 
 
As e  increases, the asymmetry in economic level of the donor countries becomes larger, the aids provided by donor 
1 increase while the aid given by donor 2 becomes more and more negative. The aid provided by donor 2 is positive 
only when 1.0581e d . That is, it is only when the donors have near symmetric economic level ( 1e  ) that both of 
them provide positive aid under non-cooperation. Otherwise, when 1e ! , the wealthier donor contributes to the poor 
while the other donor deviates from the international goal to alleviate poverty and even derives benefits from the poor.  
1 2 3 4 5
e
100
100
200
Aid, Domestic support  
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The total amount of aid given to the poor, 
* *
1 2
nc ncA A , is positive, which works as an incentive for R -government 
to decrease the domestic support provided to the poor. Even though T  decreases, however, the consumption of the 
poor increases, since 
* *
1 2
nc ncA A  is always larger than *ncT  under 1e ! . 
 
4.1.2 The case of cooperating donors 
 
Equation (22) can be rewritten as  
 
20.508 (26.55 31.4 ) 957.5 242.5 0c cA e A e      
 
and thus solved as 
 
* 20.984252(26.55 31.4 31.4 1.21472 0.282263 1.cA e e e  r   .‡ 
 
However, the only root of this equation is 
 
* 20.984252(26.55 31.4 31.4 1.21472 0.282263 1.cA e e e      
 
since the other value results in providing aid that is even larger than the income. 
Equation (23) becomes  
 
* *1.8 2.5c cT A   . 
 
and hence 
 
2* 2.5 1.77165(26.55 31.4 31.4 1.21472 0.282263 1.c e e eT        . 
 
 
 
 
 
‡ The “1.” is there to guarantee that subsequent use of that expression does not lose the fact that the expression was obtained numerically, and 
is therefore subject to numerical precision. 
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Under cooperation, both donors provide equal positive amounts of aid, 
*cA , regardless of the difference in their 
economic level. This positive amount of foreign aid provides incentives to the R -government to have a negative T . 
However, the total amount of aid given to the poor, 
*2 cA , always overrides 
*cT , resulting in increased consumption 
of the poor. 
 
4.1.3 Comparison between non-cooperating and cooperating donors 
 
It can then be observed whether cooperation or non-cooperation among donors is better at certain levels of e. 
 
 
 
As can be seen in the graph above, cooperation of the donors results in larger total aid to the poor when 
1 4.61103ed d . However, if donor 1 is more than 4.61103 times richer than donor 2, non-cooperation among the 
two is better regarding the total amounts of foreign aid given. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
e
40
20
20
40
Aid, Domestic support
1 2 3 4 5
e
10
10
20
30
40
50
Total Aid
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Cooperation of the donors leads to a larger decrease in domestic support to the poor than non-cooperation under 
1 4.54147ed d  while the opposite is true when 4.54147 ed . 
From the above results, the trends of consumption of the poor and rich can be observed, as shown in the following 
graph.  
  
 
 
When 1 5.33428ed d , cooperation among donors results in the poor having larger consumption. However, when 
donor 1 is more than 5.33428 times richer than donor 2, non-cooperation is better in terms of p
C
. 
Further, as we can see, the consumption of the poor increases when donors cooperate, but this increase is quite low 
compared with how much more the foreign economic aid donors provide if they cooperate. In fact, most of the increase 
in foreign economic aid then ends up in the pocket of the rich, thus later explaining why cooperation lowers welfare 
for the donor countries. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
e
50
40
30
20
10
10
Domestic support
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e
20
40
60
80
100
Cr , Cp
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4.2. The trends of welfare  
4.2.1 The case of non-cooperating donors 
 
The welfare of each donor and recipient country are as follows. From equations (5), (8) and (11), 
 
*
1 0.97ln(53.75 43.75 ) 0.03ln(1.70522 1.16045 )
ncW e e     
 
*
2 0.97ln(54.5 43. ) 0.03ln(1.70522 1.16045 )
ncW e e     
 
* 0.9ln(15.0448 12.0896 ) 0.1ln(1.70522 1.16045 )ncV e e     
 
 
 
 
 
 
When donor 1 provides aid to the poor under non-cooperation, its welfare decreases in comparison to the case of 
providing no aid, while the welfare of donor 2 increases. This is because the aid provided by donor 1 is positive, 
whereas donor 2 instead takes benefits from the poor.  
The welfare of the recipient increases compared with when it does not receive any aid from foreign countries. This 
is because the poor of the recipient country receive aid from outside, and the domestic support can then be transferred 
to the rich, which causes a rapid increase in V. 
 
4.2.2 The case of cooperating donors 
 
The welfare of the donors and recipient country are as follows. From equations (17) and (19), 
 
* 20.06ln(7.72638 6.1811 6.1811 1.21472 0.282263 1. )cW e e e      
20.97 ln(73.8681 30.9055 30.9055 1.21472 0.282263 1. )e e e      
1 2 3 4 5
e
1
2
3
4
5
6
W1 ,W2 ,V
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20.97 ln( 26.1319 69.0945 30.9055 1.21472 0.282263 1. )e e e      , 
 
* 23.799 1.ln(1.25 1. 1. 1.21472 0.282263 1. )cV e e e      . 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the graph above, the welfare of both donors decrease when they provide aid in a cooperative 
fashion. This is because most of the increase in aid leads the R -government to provide larger support to the rich. 
Hence, the welfare of the recipient country increases. 
 
4.2.3 Comparison of global welfare 
 
The global welfare, achieved in a non-cooperative and cooperative fashion, can be determined as  
 
* * * *
1 2
nc nc nc ncGW W W V   , 
* * *c c cGW W V   
 
respectively, which is shown as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5
e
1
2
3
4
5
6
W , V
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We can therefore observe that the global welfare of cooperating donors is higher only when 1 2.4374ed  , 
whereas the global welfare of non-cooperating donors is higher when 2.4374 ed .  
5. Concluding remarks 
When several altruistic donors provide aids to alleviate poverty of a recipient country, they face a common good 
problem. This calls for coordination for foreign economic aids policies among donors. However, uniform aids policy 
coordination might lead to adverse effects reducing the amount of aids and income transfer from the rich to the poor 
in the recipient country.  
This paper demonstrated that uniform aids policy coordination between economically asymmetric donors might 
reduce the amount of aids and welfare of both countries when the level of income asymmetry is higher than the critical 
level. In addition, cooperation among donors might improve global welfare only when the donors are symmetric in 
terms of income level and policy preferences. These results implicate that a uniform guideline for foreign aids might 
deteriorate the global welfare when donors show a significant asymmetry in their economies in terms of income level 
and policy preferences. If the asymmetry of the donor countries cannot be homogenized, higher sovereignty and 
independency in the foreign aids policy among donor might improve the global welfare and the amount of foreign aids 
according to the results obtained in this paper. 
Several caveats apply to our findings. The results obtained in this paper need to be generalized with general 
functional form in terms of social preference system. In addition, the strong assumptions and specific assignment of 
the policy preference of donor countries should be accommodated to varieties of environments to provide more general 
policy implication in the future researches.  
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